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Abstract: In 1940 Schumpeter wrote a paper entitled: “The Meaning of Rationality in the 
Social Sciences”, which was intended as a contribution to one of the meetings of a seminar 
including Talcott Parsons, Wassily Leontief, Paul Sweezy and other Harvard scholars, that he 
initiated. In this paper Schumpeter develops thoroughly his own conception of rationality in 
economics. First, this paper is interesting in itself because it relates to contemporary 
methodological debates on rationality in the social sciences. Second Schumpeter’s conception 
of rationality is linked to his methodological background (both individualistic and holistic), 
which is rooted in his economic sociology and explains the relationships he stresses between 
individual behavior and collective entities. In this contribution we present the arguments 
developed by Schumpeter in his 1940 paper and analyze the reason why his notion of 
rationality can be seen as a key component of his conception of economic and institutional 
change. 
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 Introduction 
 
 
In 1940 Schumpeter wrote a paper entitled: “The Meaning of Rationality in the Social 
Sciences.” This paper was written for one of the meetings of a interdisciplinary group1, 
referred to in the following as the Harvard Seminar that Schumpeter initiated, including the 
sociologists Wilbert E. Moore and Talcott Parsons, the economists Wassily Leontief, Paul 
Sweezy and Gottfried Haberler, the psychologist McGrannahan and other Harvard scholars 
(Swedberg, 2006). The multidisciplinary context of the Harvard Seminar certainly contributed 
to give it a strong methodological complexion. In his 1940 paper, Schumpeter indeed develop 
his own conception of rationality in economics (and not so much in the broader field of social 
sciences as the title of the paper suggests) more from the standpoint of abstract methodology 
rather than economic analysis. Interestingly, his methodological arguments turn out to 
anticipate some important debates concerning the defense of the producer’s maximization 
assumption (Alchian, 1950; Friedman, 1953), even if Schumpeter is very reluctant to use the 
‘natural selection’ analogy, which makes his conception of rationality very topical. Second, 
Schumpeter’s conception of rationality needs to be linked with his overall methodological 
approach, and in particular to the peculiar role played by economic sociology, which implies a 
both individualistic and holistic conception of economic behavior and institutional change. In 
fact our paper is a contribution to the idea that “it can be argued that Schumpeter’s synthesis 
presented a network of useful knowledge organized by the criterion of coherence.” (Shionoya, 
1997, 310). 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In section 1 we present the 
arguments developed by Schumpeter in his paper on rationality. Section 2 is an attempt to 
relate Schumpeter’s notion of rationality to the specific role played by economic sociology 
regarding economic behavior as well as the relationships between individuals and collective 
or social entities. In section 3 we examine how and why it is possible to champion an 
institutionalist interpretation of Schumpeter’s theory of economic evolution. 
 
 
1. Schumpeter’s conception of rationality 
 
At the very beginning of his paper, Schumpeter defines, following Kirchhoff’s 
definition of mechanics, what he considers being a science: “I shall define science in general 
 as the endeavor to describe phenomena we happen to be interested in, in the way most 
economical with reference to an assigned degree of accuracy.” (Schumpeter [1940] 1991, 
316). The idea of the most economical way of description is an application of Occam’s razor 
principle, which, according to Schumpeter, should not imply that logical reasoning should be 
confined to verifiable “facts” or to empirical cognition as the following quote from our author 
illustrates: “if the hypothesis that planets are moved by angels opened the shortest way to 
describing their motion, there could be no objection to it on grounds of scientific rationality.” 
(ibid pp. 316-17)2 
Schumpeter emphasizes that “both the scientific attitude and that aversion to extra-
empirical cognition are, of course, sociologically related.” (ibid, 317). More precisely, he 
points out that “[t]hey are both the products of ‘rationalist’ civilizations” but should logically 
be kept distinct” (ibid). This conception of science lends support to the idea that science is 
historically determined and is not necessarily an empirical enterprise. He also stresses that 
“[s]cientific rationality is also relative to the horizon of the analyst, that is, to the information 
and mental equipment at his command. What behavior is [therefore] rational for a given 
analyst or observer can only be determined if we know what he knows.” (ibid). This idea of 
‘historical relativism’ is recurrent in Schumpeter’s analysis and has also to be related to the 
distinction he makes between ‘rationality of the method’ and ‘rationalism’ (see Figure 1). 
This distinction emphasizes the potential discordance between what can be regarded as 
rational from the viewpoint of the method that is used at a given time and how this method is 
looked back retrospectively by a current observer3. This aspect can also be related to 
Schumpeter’s method of analysis, as developed in the introduction of his History of Economic 
Analysis. Schumpeter, indeed, emphasizes that sociological and historical matters should 
constitute fully-fledged components of economic analysis.  
These methodological remarks concern the scientific procedure as it may apply to every 
kind of science. Moreover, from the viewpoint of rationality, they only relate to what 
Schumpeter refers to as “the rationality of the observer”, i.e., the rationality of the analyst (see 
Figure 1).  Schumpeter’s aim, however, is to tackle the problem of rationality in the social 
science, and in this perspective, he contrasts the former type of rationality with what he calls 
the “rationality of the observed” and highlights several problems related to the latter4. 
First, Schumpeter raises the question of the status to be given to the ends of any 
individual action5.. This issue is taken up by Schumpeter. In compliance with Paul Sweezy, he 
emphasizes the idea that we have to face an infinite regress when we try to define ultimate 
ends, just because value judgments need to be based on other value judgments. He however 
 considers that “it is quite true that ordinarily we do not meet with ultimate values and that the 
valuations we do meet are usually intermediate ones, i.e., really refer to means to an end not 
itself under discussion.” (ibid, 318). 
Second, Schumpeter stresses the differences and relations between the rationality of the 
analytical procedure and the rationality of the result. Accordingly rationality and truth are not 
congruent even if there is a relation between them. It is interesting to note that he seems to 
disagree with Friedman’s argument (1953) that is rooted in the ‘if then’ logical properties6 
when he indicates that rationality of procedure does not warrant the rationality of the result 
“unless we include correctness and adequacy of both the material and the equipment at the 
command of the analyst which we cannot do if we admit varying horizons.” (ibid, 319). 
Schumpeter considers however that rationality of procedure is a necessary (but not sufficient) 
condition for the rationality of the result. 
Third, he emphasizes the idea that “rationality in the social sciences emanates from the 
analyst” (ibid, 319). More precisely, what Schumpeter means by this statement is that, in 
contrast to other sciences, social sciences are characterized by the fact that the analyst does 
not confine himself to draw causal relationships between objects and elaborate concepts based 
on these relationships in order to build theories or models, but that he must, in many cases7, 
also understand the meaning of individual actions and, therefore, set up norms of behavior 
(ibid, 322)8. In other words, the analyst is compelled to assume some kind of rationality in the 
real economic or social world even if true individuals do not display or do not conform to 
such rationality. This point is exemplified by the following quotation: “we will emphasize at 
once that this observer’s rationality has in itself nothing whatever to do with the presence or 
absence of rationality in the human types or human actions observed, or even with the 
applicability of the concept of rationality to the subject under investigation” (ibid,  319)9.  
Schumpeter illustrates this point by referring to the classic case of monopoly and to its 
traditional modeling by means of the marginal revenue and marginal cost curves. He 
highlights that the optimization programme does not need to be actually followed by a 
businessman in order for the maximization procedure to hold: “(…) nothing of this is 
necessary for the model to have sense and to be useful. For a man’s behavior may conform to 
it and be economically described by it, even if its contents are as foreign to his mind as the 
law of gravitation is foreign to a stone.” (ibid, 321)10.  
Such a procedure, ending in a model, provides a standard and then a description. This 
standard can thus be used to compare actual behavior or it might. It helps “to describe actual 
behavior by giving its rationale” (ibid, 322). Following Schumpeter’s terminology, this kind 
 of rationality can be described as “objective rationality (rationality in the object) seen through 
the rationality of the observer.” (ibid, 322).  
 
 
In sum, Schumpeter’s conception of rationality in the social sciences articulates two 
levels of rationality of the observer. The first one, i.e., the “rationality of the observer”, 
defines the usual rational procedure in sciences in general, while the second one emphasizes 
the specificity of social sciences, i.e., the fact that the analyst must set up norms of behavior 
that relate to the “rationality of the observed”, but that are the emanation of the analyst, in his 
endeavor to understand (in the German sense of Verstehen) the logic of individual actions. 
Schumpeter’s distinction between the ‘rationality of the observer’ and the ‘rationality of the 
observed’ also reveals the singularity of his methodological approach. In particular, 
Schumpeter’s conception of rationality is not based on the idea that there is some ‘essential’ 
rationality lying behind the existence of social reality, namely, behind the actions of concrete 
interacting men. His conception is therefore far from Menger’s, according to which the exact 
orientation of research in economics has to reveal the essence of social phenomena (‘exact 
types’ and ‘exact relationships’ between them) that is hidden behind real phenomena (‘real 
types’ and ‘real relationships’ between them). For Schumpeter, there are sociological as well 
as historical dimensions that determine the ways the observer casts some rationality on the 
observed. This assumption is essential and underlies Schumpeter’s conception of rationality in 
the social science. Several remarks by Schumpeter confirm this interpretation. 
 
First, as already emphasized above, Schumpeter claims that if the observer “has 
succeeded in ‘understanding’ the end of the observed and if he has correctly set out its 
implications then he has (…) derived a ‘norm’ which is ‘valid’, whether there are any facts 
conforming to it or not (whether it is ‘verified by facts’ or not)”. That this norm is “visualized 
as something capable of being realized” is sufficient condition of rationality at this stage. It 
corresponds to what Schumpeter calls “rationality in the object”, a kind of rationality that 
distinguishes social sciences from physical sciences or sciences in general (ibid, 323)11. 
Second, Schumpeter reminds us that “the observer needs to understand the end even if 
he does not share it” (ibid, 324)12. This remark is clearly related to the idea of historical or 
sociological relativism in Schumpeter’s methodological approach. Schumpeter here stresses 
the problem of the “infinite variety of cognate ends”, which often bias the judgment of the 
observer as regards the rationality of the observed: “[m]any types of behavior are looked upon 
 as irrational (not conforming the schema of rational action), and the range of rationality in 
action is in consequence often underestimated because the tests of rationality have been made 
by means of models that failed to fit, not because they are rational but because they did not 
capture the right type of Zweckrationalität [rationality of end].” (ibid, 324). This assertion 
relates to Schumpeter’s statement that “rationality in social sciences emanates from the 
analyst” (ibid, 319). At first sight, one may consider that it is contradictory to suppose, on the 
one hand, that the analyst, by means of the description of the world he proposes, does create 
rationality and to consider, on the other hand, that he is likely to fail in the way he describes 
the world because he misses some aspects of individuals’ rationality. This contradiction is 
however removed if one interprets correctly Schumpeter’s conception of rationality as a 
multi-level analysis of rationality (see below).  
Third, Schumpeter calls the reader’s attention to the problem of conflicting ends (ibid, 
324). This issue is essential not only because it anticipates some recent results13 in terms of 
utility functions or some of the developments of both the so-called Public Choice approach 
and agency theory, but also because it foregrounds the fact that individuals usually pursue 
several and often conflicting ends. Schumpeter gives two instances of this problem, referring 
to conflicts between the interest of the executives and the interest of a business corporation or 
between the interest of the working class and the interest of trade union officers (ibid, 325). It 
also relates, as we will emphasized in the next section, to Schumpeter’s analysis of social 
classes, more peculiarly to his distinction between self-interest and class-interest. This feature 
also clashes with the usual Austrian perspective and, again, reveals the specificity of 
Schumpeter’s overall approach to economic theory.  
Fourth, Schumpeter stresses again the distinction between rational behavior and rational 
results. The case of economic crises, which Schumpeter refers to, exemplifies the possibility 
that, even though individuals do act rationally, the collective result may be entirely irrational. 
It should be noted that this feature is perfectly in line with the usual Austrian assumption of 
‘unintended consequences of voluntary actions’. Moreover, it fits with contemporary dynamic 
models that show that evolutionary processes can end up in suboptimal outcomes. 
Fifth, Schumpeter insists on the necessity, in order for the analyst to evaluate the right 
rationality of end, to “put himself’ into places far distant from his time place and social 
location” or “to transplant himself into another cultural world” (ibid, 325). Here again, the 
idea of historical and sociological relativism is foregrounded by Schumpeter and exploited as 
an argument  to criticize Max Weber’s denial of ancient Chinese rationality14. 
 
 All these remarks concern the double dimension of the rationality of the observer 
(scientific rational procedure and rationality in the object) in the social sciences. However, 
Schumpeter does not neglect the existence of a third type of rationality, namely “subjective 
rationality” or “conscious or subjective rationality15” (of the observed; see Figure 1) even if 
he gives the reader the impression that he treats it as secondary. Two reasons may explain 
Schumpeter’s attitude.  
First, he argues on logical grounds that objective rationality (or rationality in the object) 
does not imply a one-to-one relation to the subjective one. First, “it is not necessary that the 
subjective rationality of actors works in the same way as the rationality of the observer” (ibid, 
328). The case of the Cournot-Marshall monopoly is a good example of this absence of 
conformity. Second, “it might be objective that whatever we may find out by means of 
subjective rationality can always be embodied in our ‘objective rational’ models so that there 
is no reason after all to stress what the subjective rationality might be in the actors we 
observe.” (ibid, 328) 
Second, in compliance with his ‘institutionalist’ conception of individual behavior (see 
above), he considers that to focus on subjective rationality is to overestimate the range of 
conscious and deliberate behavior. He refers in this respect to Marshall and Wicksell, stating 
that the way they expressed themselves suggests “excessive reliance on subjective rationality” 
(ibid, 336). In other terms, according to Schumpeter, workers in the social science often go 
too far by assuming implicitly or explicitly that individuals “are themselves actuated by 
clearly perceived motives, and regulate their behavior with conscious rationality working in 
the full daylight of their ego’s” (subjective rationality), whereas the supposedly “conscious 
motives that a man will tell himself and others are largely [ex post] rationalizations of 
unconscious or innate impulses.” (ibid, 326).  
 
Nevertheless, Schumpeter does not dispose of the problem of subjective rationality and 
of its relation with objective rationality, in particular, the question as to whether subjective 
rationality is in conformity with objective rationality or not.  
For him, the distinction between objective and subjective rationality16, and more 
precisely, the procedure which consist in focusing on subjective rationality, can be relevant, 
from a heuristical viewpoint, when it permits to gain analytical control on the phenomena we 
observe and to avoid redundant assumptions as regards individual behavior. It is also valuable 
when one uses rational schemata as ‘interpretative schema’. In these conditions, the ultimate 
objective finality (as founded on the speculative knowledge (Erkenntnisgrund) of the observer 
 becomes an ‘explanatory hypothesis’ of the actual individual’s behavior (Realgrund). If for 
any reason this hypothesis is not justified, then the conformity between subjective and 
objective rationality becomes a puzzle to be solved. Symmetrically, conformity between 
objective and subjective rationality permits to establish diagnostic as well as previsions 
inasmuch as people actually behave like the observer think they do. It is then possible for the 
observer to perfectly anticipate the way people will behave and accordingly the results of their 
behaviors.  
But the relevance of subjective rationality to analysis stands out more clearly in cases in 
which rational schemata do not fit. In this case, i.e., when rational schemata based on 
objective rationality fail to capture adequately actual behavior, “(…) deficiency in subjective 
rationality may directly be the reason we seek, or one of these reasons”. It is nevertheless true 
that “(…) investigation of subjective rationality may put us on to the track of other reasons 
and even help us to identify the right ‘objectively rational model’.” (ibid, 329). 
   
 
Schumpeter’s conception of rationality can be summarized by emphasizing the two 
levels that it involves. 
The first level is provided by the distinction between two kinds of rationality: the 
‘rationality of the observer’ and the ‘rationality in the observed’ (see level I/II on Figure 1) 17. 
This first level permits him to establish the borderline between natural sciences, on the one 
hand, and social sciences, where the relationships between the analyst (the observer) and the 
social reality (the observed) become fundamental, on the other hand. In other terms, 
Schumpeter’s overall schema of rationality is to be considered as a general framework of 
rational models that is not confined to the problem of rationality in the social sciences, but 
also to include rational models belonging to the natural sciences. This is exemplified by the 
fact that in many passages of his paper, Schumpeter analyzes the differences between natural 
(mostly physics) and social sciences (mostly economics). As we have emphasized, this first 
distinction also underlines the specificity of social sciences with respect to rationality, i.e., the 
fact that in the social sciences the observer needs to be ‘rational’ in a double sense: he has to 
make use of logical reasoning in order to set up models, but also has to understand the ends 
that individuals pursue. Social sciences share however the characteristics and then the 
properties of rational schemata in the natural sciences, namely, the necessity to offer an 
accurate description of the (social) reality, the use of logical tools in order to develop 
arguments and historical and sociological relativism. Those elements that are common to both 
 social and natural sciences are located on the left of the dotted bold vertical line on Figure 1, 
while on the right side of this line, the specificity of the social sciences in terms of rationality 
is sketched out .  
The second level of Schumpeter’s analysis of rationality concentrates on rationality in 
the social sciences per se. This level now consists in the distinction between ‘objective 
rationality’ and ‘subjective rationality’ (this level is identified by the continuous ellipse and 
the distinction by means of the dotted fine vertical line on Figure 1). This level of analysis 
permits Schumpeter to stress the importance of the notion of subjective rationality and its 
relationships with the notion of objective rationality. The fact that this distinction corresponds 
to the one made, respectively, between consciousness and subconsciousness is perfectly 
justified since, as we have underlined, ‘objective rationality’ is assigned to individuals’ 
behavior by the analyst. In other words, the rationality of the observed is seen through the 
rationality of the observer. At the opposite, ‘subjective rationality’ is necessarily conscious 
since it is an understandable and explicit account (in terms of means and ends) of the effective 
behavior of individuals18. In other words, individuals are ‘objectively rational’ when the 
analyst correctly (that is logically or on the basis of data) describes their behavior even if 
individuals do not know that they ‘have’ to behave in this way; while they are ‘subjectively 
rational’ when they have ‘good reasons’ to behave as they actually do, and that those ‘good 
reasons’ can be made explicit. 
 
We shall now investigate in more details Schumpeter’s conception of rationality 
relates to his overall methodological approach and in particular, to the role he ascribes to 
economic sociology as far as individual economic behavior and its relation to social entities 
are concerned. 
This inquiry will be carried out in two successive steps. First, we will concentrate on 
Schumpeter’s economic sociology by focusing on its connection with economic behavior as 
well as the relations between individuals and collective entities such as social classes. We will 
also consider Schumpeter’s analysis of the evolution of social structures in order to show how 
it can be connected to the issue of conflicting ends as developed in his 1940 article on 
rationality (section 2). 
The second step will consists in an attempt to sketch out a preliminary picture of how 
institutional change may occur in Schumpeter’s overall framework, by focusing, in this 
perspective, on how it can be related  both to his conception of rationality and his dynamic 
analysis of social classes (Section 3).  
 Rational schemata or models (interpreted) 
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Figure 1. Rational schemata or models 
 
 
 
2. The nature and the role of social entities and Schumpeter’s conception of 
rationality 
 
 As we have emphasized in the previous section, Schumpeter raises the issue of 
conflicting ends as an illustration of methodological problems associated with the notion of 
rationality in the social sciences. Furthermore, he also warns the reader against the use of 
flawed schemata of rationality based on a unique identified end, indicating that in many cases, 
Rationality of the observer (I)                         Rationality of the observed (II) 
A       B 
 actual behavior fails to confirm such rational schemata, not because individuals behave in an 
irrational manner, but because they often pursue several and often conflicting ends that have 
not been identified and prioritized correctly by the social scientist. As we will develop in this 
section, there is a connection between the problem of conflicting ends and Schumpeter’s 
contribution to economic sociology, in particular, his analysis of social classes as social 
entities. This connection favors an institutionalist interpretation of Schumpeter’s theory of 
economic evolution, in which conflicts between self-interest and class-interest play an 
important role.    
 
In his 1940 paper, Schumpeter suggests that the problem of conflicting ends may 
originate in the divergence in terms of motivations between individual rationality (in the sense 
of self-interest) and ‘collective rationality’19 (in the sense of class-interest). This is one of the 
main reasons why, according to Schumpeter, the observer needs to understand individuals’ 
ends when he wants to set up logically constructed theories in the social sciences. More 
precisely, Schumpeter argues that the analyst or observer has to get a comprehension of 
individuals’ ends because those ends which determine the means used to satisfy them impact 
on the result of individual and collective action, even if there is some irreducible 
indeterminacy in this result. From a different perspective, the possibility of conflicting ends 
permits to conceive not only the fact that non-economic ends can be important for the 
cohesion of social classes but also that some non-commonly shared economic ends can be 
followed by individuals. As we will develop below, innovations are possible only because 
entrepreneurs display a kind of behavior that differs from the usual maximizing (or even 
satisfying) economic behavior. 
This conception of individual’s behavior is, of course, in line with the Austrian 
‘subjectivist’ tradition, but, more importantly, it is consistent with Schumpeter’s idea that 
entrepreneurs, even though they are perfectly rational, follow some non-commonly shared 
specific economic ends. In this way, entrepreneurs are conceived as rational but, just because 
they do not follow merely economic ends, they do introduce disequilibrium into the stationary 
circular flow, thus permitting qualitative change to ensue. In other terms, the idea of non- 
commonly shared ends permits to put together the propositions that a stationary economic 
equilibrium is possible and that this equilibrium can be destabilized by some rational agents. 
As Schumpeter stresses, this conception is not based on psychological arguments. It is more 
relevant to say that it is due to his conception of individual rationality, which is strongly 
connected to the role of economic sociology in his general method. 
 As is well known, Schumpeter’s method is clearly defined in Chapter 2 of his History of 
Economic Analysis (1954), where he distinguishes the three ‘techniques’ – history, statistics 
and (economic) theory -  that together constitute ‘economic analysis’. In addition to these 
three techniques, there is economic sociology which constitutes a fully-fledged component of 
his methodology. The arguments in support of Schumpeter’s claim for the introduction of a 
supplementary technique in the toolbox of economists may be summarized as follows. 
On the one hand, he argues that the institution of property and freedom of contract or the 
introduction of any kind of government regulation are not only a concern of economic history 
but they constitute social facts that shape the society and thus make economic history a kind 
or generality, a type or a model. From this perspective, economic sociology can be described, 
in accordance with Schmoller’s definition as a ‘theory of generalizing history’ or, as Shionoya 
puts it nicely, as a “bridge between history and theory” or as a “compromise between the 
generality meant by theory and the individuality meant by history” (Shionoya 1991; Shionoya 
1997, 200).  
 
On the other hand, Schumpeter emphasizes the fact that economic sociology provides a theory 
of economic behavior conceived as embedded and interacting with the institutional setting of 
the whole society and not assumed as a datum inherited from history. The following quotation 
taken from Schumpeter’s History of Economic Analysis, reinforces the argument by locating 
the demarcation line between theory and economic sociology precisely at the level of the 
assumptions concerning behavior: 
 
“ (…) economic analysis deals with the questions how people behave at any time 
and what the economic effects are they produce by so behaving; economic 
sociology deals with the question how they came to behave as they do. If we 
define human behaviour widely enough so that it includes not only actions and 
motives and propensities but also the social institutions that are relevant to 
economic behavior such as government, property inheritance, contract, and so on, 
that phrase really tells us what we need. ” (Schumpeter 1954: 47–8, underlined by 
us) 
 
Therefore, economic sociology is valuable and deserves special focus because it permits to 
deal with the institutional background underlying economic behavior. To put it differently, 
economic sociology permits to endogenize a factor, namely economic behavior, which is 
 usually taken as exogenous by economic analysis. Such a procedure also permits to derive 
heterogeneous norms of behavior, in contrast to the uniform and universal norm of behavior, 
i.e. the hedonistic (and static) norm of behavior taken for granted by Walrasian economic 
analysis. This argument can also be extended in order to deal with Schumpeter’s conception 
of rationality. Taking into account economic sociology indeed permits a better understanding 
of Schumpeter’s multi-level methodological perspective (in particular, the distinction 
‘rationality of the observer’ vs. ‘rationality of the observed’) concerning the problem of 
rationality in economics. More generally, the introduction of economic sociology into 
Schumpeter’s methodological framework permits to extend the range of application of 
rational models as compared to pure economic theory.   
Finally, and more generally, economic sociology can be interpreted as a bridge between 
statics and dynamics, or as means to unify Schumpeter’s analytical framework, by qualifying 
the usual argument of the logical inconsistency between the routine-based static circular flow 
and the case of development, supposedly arising endogenously from the circular flow. If 
economic sociology can be considered as secondary for economists whom interest is focused 
on the working of stationary economic states, it becomes however a central issue for dealing 
with economic dynamics, as Schumpeter defines it, i.e., “such changes in economic life as are 
not forced upon it from without but arise by its own initiative, from within.” (Schumpeter 
1934, 63). Under those circumstances, economic sociology cannot be considered as non 
economical, and thus must also to be distinguished from simple sociology. Moreover, since 
Schumpeter excludes from the definition of economic development such changes in data or in 
economic conditions, to which the economy continuously adapts (ibid), economic sociology 
provides the tool for dealing with the social structure of an economic system. More precisely, 
for Schumpeter, economic sociology or social institutions are more than a complement to 
economic analysis. They rather constitute a logical priority to it. In other terms, for 
Schumpeter, it is not possible to deal with economic change without considering 
complementary and necessary previous institutional change20 (see Figure 2).  
  
 
  
  
Figure 2. The place of economic sociology in Schumpeter’s method 
 
 
To put in a nutshell, what we want to emphasize here is the fact that individual 
behavior is determined by a bundle of individual as well as collective ends – as captured, 
essentially, by the distinction between self-interest and class-interest – that may conflict with 
each other, and may explain the heterogeneity of observed behaviors. Moreover, individual 
behaviors are contextualized insofar as individuals have to realize some functions that are 
socially defined. We will see below that their capacities to perform those functions make them 
evolving inside the society, improving or worsening their social positions accordingly. It is 
their very aptitude to perform those social functions that permit them to increase their position 
inside the social structure. The effectiveness of their actions is also conditioned by the social 
environment: in some cases there can be some resistance to novelty due to established social 
values, behavioral routines, etc. In this case, leadership is the main aptitude they have to 
possess in order to break with old habits or tradition. 
 
But before analyzing Schumpeter’s approach of the relationships between individual 
behaviors and the social structure, we need to make a detour via his analysis of the nature, 
function and evolution of social classes. 
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Economic  
theory 
Increasing degree of abstraction 
Conflicting ends 
Class interest / self-interest Single end 
Some norms of behavior or 
regularities 
Adaptive / Innovative 
behavior embedded and 
interacting with the 
institutional setting.  
A uniform and universal 
norm of behavior: 
Hedonistic behavior 
 
 
 
Institutional and economic 
change 
     Statics 
 
  According to Schumpeter, social classes can be conceived either as social organisms 
that act as such, i.e., social entities per se, or as the invention of researchers. The problem is 
that those two conceptions of social classes are often confused. More precisely, in his 1927 
Essay on social classes, Schumpeter identifies four problems that arise when “sociological 
scientists” try to define social classes: the nature of classes (and their functions), class 
cohesion, class formation (that explains why the social whole is not homogenous) and “the 
concrete causes and conditions of an individually determined, historically given class 
structure” (Schumpeter (1991) [1927], 233). This last problem is important because it 
reinforces the idea that classes are historically dependent entities. In sum, for Schumpeter, 
groups or social classes are not in general to be explained by reference to a particular purpose. 
Mostly, sociological location and history are necessary to understand their nature and 
behavior. Finally, Schumpeter considers that, although there is no such thing as classless 
society, it is nevertheless possible to identify principles that explain the formation, nature and 
basic laws of social classes. 
As far as the relationships between individual rationality and social entities are 
concerned, Schumpeter first stresses that “the class membership of an individual is a primary 
fact, originally quite independent of his will”, although “(…) he does not always confirm that 
allegiance by his conduct.” (ibid, 236).  
In the first part of this quotation, Schumpeter specifies the unit of selection that 
underlies his conception of social classes: family is conceived as the definite unit of selection 
(see Figure 3). Individuals belong to families and family is then the primary and relevant level 
of analysis of the selection process21. 
The second part of the quotation, however, stresses the fact that individuals are within 
a given economic and social context the active units of evolution (see Figure 3)22. More 
precisely, only individuals permit the modifications of 1) the position of individuals’ families 
inside a class, 2) the families’ capability to cross the boundaries of classes and 3) finally the 
rise and fall of classes. In fact, “it is always ‘behavior’ and ‘aptitude’ that explain shifts in the 
relative positions which originally existed.” (ibid, 246). The shifts that characterize the 
evolution of class structure need to be linked with the importance of the “method of striking 
out along unconventional paths” which is, with chance and success “along wonted and 
ordained lines” the most important element that explains rising higher classes23. This idea 
strengthens the fact that individuals possess all the same basic characteristics24 that make 
them adaptable to specific historical contexts. Capitalism is not creating entirely new 
individuals not existing before inside other classes but permits individuals to manifest 
 differently their aptitudes: “[b]ecause of the limited opportunities open to working-class 
families, this is virtually the only method by which they can make the great leap out of their 
class.” (ibid). In other words, class composition is constantly changing: it “resembles a hotel 
or an omnibus, always full, but always of different people.” (ibid, 248).  
If individuals are, due to their personal aptitudes, able to change the relative position 
of their families inside a given social and economic context, the principle of selection that 
makes them successful in their enterprise is defined by the extent to which they have the 
capacities to perform some specific social functions. Accordingly, the functional adequacy of 
behaviors is the relevant principle of selection (see Figure 3). This functional vision of the 
class structure is perfectly illustrated by the following quotation: 
 
“Just as the manorial system corresponds to the type of the knightly warrior-politician 
and warrior-administrator, so the system of large landed estates corresponds to the 
type of the aristocratic businessman.” (ibid, 268, italics in the original) 
 
Consequently “the social importance of class members varies with (…) two basic 
elements – the importance of the class function and the degree of success in carrying out that 
function.” (ibid, 272). However, the adequacy between class structure and social functions 
first, is not an automatic and direct relation; second, is determined by an economic logic and 
third, is a long and slow process.  
First, the process of evolution of classes and class structure is not straightforward in 
the sense that there exists no direct relationship between the existence of a class and its actual 
function. In particular, classes can survive even if the conditions that explain their existence 
have disappeared: “[c]lasses, once they have come into being, harden in their mold and 
perpetuate themselves, even when the social conditions that created them have disappeared.” 
(ibid, 237). This social inertia corresponds to the existence of a kind of ‘hysteresis effect’ (the 
cause has disappeared but the effect remains). Moreover, the processes of translation of social 
functions into institutional rules are heterogeneous and have different lags depending of the 
kinds of rules concerned: “the ‘superstructure’ of law, custom, and so forth is always the last 
to change, always lags behind changes in the actual life situation.” (ibid, 262). Finally, the 
members of a declining class can use some stratagems in order to slow down the decline of 
their social position insofar as the “survival of some conspicuous externals serve to slow 
down the full effect of the internal [and necessary] change.” (ibid, 266). To sum up, “there is 
an understandable tendency to continue the old functions in form rather than in substance.” 
 (ibid, 264). Success partly explains this inertia. More precisely, “success, once achieved, 
exerts a continuing effect, without further accomplishment, for two reasons: first of all, the 
prestige it engenders assumes a life of its own. It does not necessarily vanish when its basis 
fades away – nor, for that matter, does its basis readily disappear. This is the very heart and 
soul of the independent organic existence of “class”. In the second place, in the vast majority 
of cases, success brings in its wake important functional positions and other powers over 
material resources. The position of the physical individual becomes entrenched, and with it 
that of the family.” (ibid, 278–9). 
Second, the ‘ultimate causes’ of the evolution of social functions are economic ones, 
even if sometimes they do not appear as conspicuous or immediate: “(…) such causes, on 
their part, can always be reduced to those basic elements [the importance of the class function 
and the degree of success in carrying out that function], just as, according to the economic 
interpretation of history, the flow of social events is always, ultimately shaped by the inner 
logic of the economic machine, though very often this influence is anything but direct.” (ibid, 
272). Social functions are then in their very definition and evolution determined by economic 
factors25. Those economic ultimate causes are however not directly leading the actual 
evolution of class structure as emphasized in the previous quotation. Consequently, there is a 
sort of disconnection between the fundamental economic causes and the apparent evolution of 
class structure. This feature is also emphasized, as already pointed out, in Schumpeter’s 
Theory of Economic Development, where the author refers on the one hand, to “the 
fundamental dependence of the economic aspect of things on everything else”, and on the 
other hand, states that, as a consequence, “it is not possible to explain economic change by 
previous economic conditions alone” so that “we can state that the economic world is 
relatively autonomous because it takes up such a great part of a nation’s life, and forms or 
conditions a great part of the remainder” (Schumpeter 1934, 58) 
Third, the ‘functional’ evolution is not a fast and ‘punctuated’ equilibrium 
phenomenon26. In fact, even if some accidents such as revolutions or wars can accelerate the 
social evolutionary process27, the quick changes are mainly due to the failure of the incumbent 
upper classes to remain at their positions and then to perform their (or some new) social 
functions: “[f]rom the viewpoint of class history and class theory, we are concerned, first, 
with the fact that class functions and their relative social necessity change only slowly.” (ibid, 
276). 
What seems important to remember at this stage in order to grasp the main features of 
social evolution in Schumpeter is that individuals are the units of the evolution of the structure 
 of social classes. Their aptitude to satisfy necessary social functions makes their family, 
which is the unit of selection, evolving inside the social class structure. However, the 
evolution of the social class structure usually lags behind the evolution of the social functions, 
due to both inertia phenomena (comparable to hysteresis effects) and resistance from families 
to the evolution of their social status. Individuals’ behaviors that are the mainspring of social 
evolution are nevertheless indirectly subject to the evolution of the position of the family and 
the social class they belong to, the function of which, as we have emphasized is ultimately 
driven by economic forces. Finally, individuals’ aptitudes and in fine, individuals’ ends, 
which characterize their rationality, are the basic elements that explain the efficiency of their 
actions. If differences in individuals’ aptitudes, and in particular, the aptitude for leadership 
explains the evolution of the family position in a given social class structure and of the 
relative position of the social classes themselves, they amount, in the final resort, to 
differences in the individual’s bundles of ends that motivate the acquisition of aptitudes (even 
if some aptitudes are partially given or socially inherited). In fact, for Schumpeter, 
individuals’ aptitudes are embedded in an ethically homogeneous environment and are 
“probably distributed according to a normal curve.” (ibid, 276). As Schumpeter emphasizes: 
“our present purpose is served well enough by the fact, scarcely disputed, that individual 
differences do exist and that individual aptitudes do not fall into sharply marked categories, 
separated by empty space, but shade by imperceptible nuances from high to low.” (ibid, 277).  
Moreover, differences in aptitudes, such as the aptitude for leadership for instance, are 
defined as “special function[s], always clearly discernible in the actions of the individual and 
within a social whole. [They] emerge only with respect to ever new individual and social 
situations and would never exist if individual and national life always ran its course in the 
same way and by the same routine.” (ibid. 278). It is therefore the abilities of some 
individuals to escape from routinized motivations that explain the emergence of new aptitudes 
and, finally, of new behaviors. As Schumpeter emphasizes in Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy, routines are part of the underlying institutional setting “which compel individuals 
and groups to behave in certain ways whatever they may wish to do – not indeed by 
destroying their freedom of choice but by shaping the choosing mentalities and by narrowing 
the list of possibilities from which to choose. (Schumpeter 1950, 129–30).  
This feature is perfectly in line with the idea that individuals’ rationality is related to a 
trade-off between possible conflicting ends, which results in a given behavior (which conveys 
the relation between means and ends). Furthermore, since the composition of the bundle of 
ends (in particular, the relative weight of individual and social motives) evolve through time, 
 some ends are likely to emerge, while others may disappear, depending on the ability of 
individuals, i.e., their aptitudes, to perform some necessary social functions in a given 
economic environment. Moreover, as we shall now develop more deeply, the performance of 
individual actors also depends on the institutional and social context in which they are 
embedded. In particular, institutional change, and therefore, economic change, can be 
triggered if some agents have not only the aptitude, but also the energy to go beyond establish 
collective routines. In such a case, the element of novelty which is introduced in the society is 
likely to be diffused and to exert lasting effects on individuals’ behaviors in the future.     
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Figure 3. Evolution of the social class structure 
 
 
 
3. The relationships between individual rationality and collective entities and 
Schumpeter’s conception of institutional and economic change. 
 
 In this section, we argue that Schumpeter’s theory of institutional and economic change 
needs to be analyzed in relation to his conception of the relationships between individual 
rationality and social class structure dynamics.  
 According to Schumpeter, there is a correspondence, sometimes weak, between the 
economic and social functions and individuals’ conflicting ends. This correspondence is 
effective as soon as individuals reveal some aptitudes to perform their economic and social 
functions. It is the reason why human motives are never strictly individual and that their 
effective behaviors are only the symptom of the existence of their class membership. Rather, 
they are always embedded in a social and historical context under which they have emerged. 
This characteristic is symptomatic of Schumpeter methodological approach. As Donzelli 
(1983: 639) reminds us, as early as in 1908 in his doctorate dissertation, Schumpeter devoted 
an entire chapter to a detailed discussion on methodological individualism vs. methodological 
holism, aiming not at establishing the superiority of either approach, but rather, at specifying 
their respective arenas of application28. Moreover, according to Agassi the three respective 
characteristics29 of holism and individualism contradict if and only if a fourth proposition is 
added: “If ‘wholes’ exist then they have distinct aims and interests of their own.” (Agassi 
1975, 147).  Because Schumpeter does not accept such a proposition (which, Agassi shows, is 
easily avoidable) it follows that his holism and individualism do not contradict. 
 In his 1927 essay on Social Classes, as already emphasized, Schumpeter attempts to 
evaluate the impact of social classes on individual motives and behaviors and assesses that 
social forces do have some autonomy vis-à-vis individual motives or ends. This feature does 
not imply, however, that individuals have no leeway in their actions. We indeed have shown 
that, in Schumpeter, the construction process of social class rests on individuals’ aptitudes and 
their adequacy with the social function they have to perform in a given society.  
On the other hand, Schumpeter uses the notion of rationality for individuals but assumes the 
existence of classes as real and effective entities. As we wrote above, this last aspect is 
perfectly developed in Schumpeter ([1991] 1927) and the idea that classes or collective 
entities (families) can ‘act’ as such is fundamental30. This aspect is also to be compared with 
Wieser’s approach to the evolution of institutions (Festré, 2006). Wieser indeed emphasizes 
the idea that collective entities (‘masses’ and ‘power strata’ in Wieser (1926)) do exist. This 
feature allows both Wieser and Schumpeter to provide an analysis of the evolution of 
institutions and not only of their emergence inasmuch as these two levels (the individual and 
the collective one) do interact.  
Such an interpretation of Schumpeter also challenges Perroux, who criticizes Schumpeter, in 
his well-known introduction to the French translation of the Theory of Economic 
Development, for having provided only a theory of emergence and not a theory of evolution 
of institutions. This is perfectly right insofar as we suppose that Schumpeter’s methodology is 
 only an individualistic one. If however one considers that his methodology is both 
individualistic and holistic, then the emergence and the evolution of institutions and, more 
generally, of the evolution of the whole economy can be reconciled on the basis of an 
institutionalist interpretation of Schumpeter’s conception of economic development (Festré 
and Nasica, 2006). Institutions and institutional change indeed permit some behaviors to 
emerge, so that institutions can partly be seen as the crystallization of individuals’ behaviors. 
For instance, the emergence of bankers permitting the creation and diffusion of credit (as an 
economic institution) in the economic system supports the existence of entrepreneurs as 
innovators. The banking system must already exist as a matter of logical priority for capitalist 
forms of entrepreneurship to develop. But the banking system is not only a specific form of 
social organization; it also supports the diffusion of new behavioural rules, which are more 
adapted to industrial organization. 
Accordingly, there is a phenomenon of composition of individuals’ behaviors 
following specific (understandable) ends and connecting means with these ends, which 
permits the emergence of collective local ends that appear as constraints and can possibly 
enter in conflict with the ends of individuals belonging to those collective entities. Such an 
explanation is a possible way for creating compatibility between the existence of both 
individualism and holism in Schumpeter’s works. It also paves the way for his conception of 
economic development based on an institutionalist approach of evolution. 
In sum, economic as well as social evolution is co-determined by individual as well as 
collective forces. Individuals’ behaviors are not entirely determined by collective and social 
constraints. They can give up routines and socially anchored behaviors. This possibility lies in 
the Schumpeterian conception of individuals’ motives and then of conflicting ends. 
Nevertheless, those ‘out of conventions’ behaviors need to be socially approved of in terms of 
the functions they can perform. What seems to be crucial for Schumpeter is that novelty, 
economic and institutional change cannot be grasped on purely individualistic terms. 
Moreover, this process involves a specific conception of individual behavior and rationality.   
 
On one hand, some kind of energy as well as leadership are required, which explain why 
Schumpeter privileges the captain of industry or the promoter form of entrepreneurship in his 
theoretical construction of economic development. The notion of energy is indeed connected 
to Schumpeter’s analysis of leadership defined as a “special function”, which is a permanent 
feature of human societies and aims at taking the predominant decisions for the future of 
society (Schumpeter 1927 [1991], 278. As is well known, the reference to social leadership is 
 quite widespread within the Austrian literature. Max Weber also introduced the concept of the 
‘charismatic leader’, which, though defined differently from Schumpeter’s leadership, is also 
associated with social change and the introduction of new behavioral rules and social norms. 
Wieser also provided an analysis of leadership conceived as a permanent feature of 
civilization, ruled by the law of small numbers and whose function is to permit economic and 
social progress.  
The reference to energy and leadership as decisive factors of evolution are frequent in 
Schumpeter’s writings.  In his essay entitled The Sociology of Imperalisms, Schumpeter refers 
to the “instinctive urge to domination” (Schumpeter 1951 [1919], p. 15) or to “activity urges 
springing from capacities and inclinations that had once been crucial to survival, though they 
had now outlived their usefulness” (ibid. p. 44). These ‘urges’ (or Trieb, ibid. p. 83) are 
defined by Schumpeter as human inclinations that have more to do with ‘instinct’ than with 
reason (ibid. p 83–4). In warlike societies, those kind of urges are devoted to fighting , 
whereas in capitalist societies, excess energy is channeled into the introduction of 
innovations, such as new products, new productive techniques, or new corporate 
organizational forms.  
In his 1908 doctorate dissertation (Habilitations-Schrift) entitled Das Wesen und der 
Hauptinhalt der theoretischen Nationalökonomie as well as in the first German edition of his 
TED, Schumpeter contrasts the energetic form of egoism to the hedonistic one (Schumpeter 
1908: 86-87; Schumpeter 1912). ‘Hedonistic egoism’ describes Walrasian rational behavior 
whereas the notion of ‘energetic egoism’ is confined to an active and ‘volontarist’ behavior 
based on a different kind of rationality (see Santanelli and Pesciarelli 1990 p. 684-7 and 
Arena 1992 pp. 133-5). This distinction permits, in particular, as we shall analyze, to contrast 
the purest form of entrepreneurship from other producers who essentially follow routines of 
behavior.  
This distinction must also be put in perspective with Schumpeter’s 1940 article on 
rationality. As we have shown, in this paper, Schumpeter reasserts his reservations about the 
use of strict individualism within social sciences, which assumes: “that the individuals under 
research – sometimes even the ‘people’ as such – are themselves actuated by clearly 
perceived motives, and regulate their behavior with conscious rationality working in the full 
daylight of the egos (subjective rationality).” By relying on such a procedure, however, 
“analysts, especially those of bygone generations, have almost overrated the actual range of 
consciously rational action.” (Schumpeter 1991 [1940], 326)   
  
On the other hand, there must be something more for novelty to operate.  To 
understand Schumpeter’s attempt to deal with this difficult issue requires us to look carefully 
at his early writings dedicated to economic sociology as well as to account, again, for his dual, 
both individualistic and holistic, methodology. Contrary to what is usually maintained in the 
literature (see for instance Perroux, op. cit.), we think that Schumpeter not only provided an 
explanation of the emergence of change but also offered some very insightful principles of 
how institutions and behavior may evolve. This interpretation is reinforced if we take 
Schumpeter’s way of dealing with rationality seriously, and in particular, the idea that 
individuals’ ends may result from conflicts between self-interest and class-interest. Those 
ends, which are distinct from instincts, impact on behaviors, which are then both individually 
and collectively determined. This conception of individuals’ behavior, as resulting from both 
self and social determination, permits first to avoid a purely instinct-based approach and 
second to justify a methodology that combines the individualistic approach with the holistic 
one. However, if aptitude and conscious behavior explain the heterogeneity of individual 
behaviors and the possibility of conflicting ends between self-interest and class-interest, 
unconscious or instinctive capacities, as emphasized above, also play a role in triggering 
changes in routines or behavior. For Schumpeter, the unconscious urges also involve 
creativity and entail permanent changes as well as self-reinforcing mechanisms in the sphere 
in which they appear. Referring to “warrior nations” (Schumpeter 1951 [1919], 49), 
Schumpeter argues that “the explanation lies, instead, in the vital needs of situations that 
molded peoples and classes into warriors – if they wanted to avoid extinction – and in the fact 
that psychological dispositions and social structures acquired in the past in such situations, 
once firmly established, tend to maintain themselves and to continue in effect long after they 
have lost their meaning and their life-preserving function.” (Schumpeter 1951 [1919], 83–4). 
Schumpeter adds that history shows why and how these civilizations survived. The survival of 
those civilizations indeed implies the crystallization of all “popular forces” that characterize 
this people, included “those in the ideological sphere” in order to constitute “a war machine 
that, once in motion, continues so long as there is steam behind it and it does not run up 
against a stone wall.” (Schumpeter 1951 [1919], 49).  
But what explains the longevity of such civilizations is more the phenomenon of 
leadership than passive adaptation. In a footnote, Schumpeter writes: “this is no mere analogy 
[i.e. the analogy to a war machine] of the kind rightly held in contempt. We are dealing with 
 the facts that every purposive organization by its mere existence adapts its members to its 
purpose.” (Schumpeter 1951 [1919], 49 fn.). Shionoya summarizes the role played by creative 
activity and novelty in Schumpeter, emphasizing that it inevitably entails some indeterminacy 
and some path-dependency. Moreover, creative activity is also related to the phenomenon of 
leadership. As emphasized by Shionoya: 
 
“In the first place, creative activity cannot be predicted by applying the ordinary rules 
of inference from the pre-existing facts. It is so unique that the mechanism of the 
modus operandi must be examined on a case-by-case basis. Second, creative activity 
shapes the whole course of subsequent events and their long-term outcome, causes 
discontinuity from preceding situations. Third, creative activity is an enigma of human 
beings and has something to do with the distribution of talent and therefore with the 
phenomenon of leadership.” (Shionoya 1997, 175). 
 
Schumpeter’s claim for the use of economic sociology within his overall 
methodological approach reinforces his reluctance to a pure individualist approach to social 
sciences, in particular, if it is associated with a universally alleged objective rational 
behavior31. The recourse to economic sociology indeed permits to assess a key role for 
leadership as a recurrent characteristic for institutional and economic change to occur. As we 
have emphasized, institutional change involves the emergence of new behavioral and social 
norms.  Leadership is indeed associated with the motivation of breaking up with routines that 
is rendered possible by the excess of energy that characterizes them. But their success does 
not only depend on their intrinsic characteristics, but also on their social leadership, i.e., on 
their ability to make novelty being accepted by the community of followers or imitators. This 
process of diffusion is based on self-organization and self-reinforcement mechanisms, but 
also on social imitation, which takes place on a multi-level – family, intra- and inter- class – 
basis. Finally, we have illustrated that economic sociology can be seen as a conceptual bridge 
between history and economic theory, insofar as it permits to discern amongst the varied 
origins and institutional settings that shape the social world similar patterns of behaviors that 
characterize normative phenomena, such as leadership. From this perspective, and as will be 
shown in the following, entrepreneurship can only be considered as a derived form of 
leadership associated with peculiar behavioral and rationality features.  
 
 The relationships between individual rationality and class structure as well as the key 
role played by economic sociology in Schumpeter can be exemplified by his conception of 
entrepreneurship. In a 1928 paper entitled Unternehmer (Entrepreneur), Schumpeter provides 
a typology of individual-level forms of entrepreneurship. In this article, he distinguishes 
between four “types of modern entrepreneurship” (Schumpeter, 1928: 483-5; translation by 
Becker and Knudsen, 2003: 251-4): the factory owner and merchant; the modern captain of 
industry; the manager who actually carries out the entrepreneurial function and the ‘founder’ 
(promoter) 
Schumpeter distinguishes those four types from a multi-criteria perspective according 
to a) the selection process; b) the functions (or managerial roles) fulfilled; c) the social 
position; d) the relationship between entrepreneurial position and capital; e) the values (both 
individual and social), i.e., in other terms, following Schumpeter’s terminology in his 1940 
paper on rationality, the result and expression of conflicting ends; f) the motivation; g) the 
competence (aptitude) in particular business matters32. In what follows, we will focus in 
particular on four of those criteria, namely, the motivation, the aptitudes, the function and the 
social position of the different types of entrepreneurs, as summarized in Figure 4. Our main 
point is to show that conflicting ends generate motivations that produce aptitudes. 
  Criteria Factory owner and 
merchant 
Manager Modern captain of 
industry 
Founder or 
promoter 
Motivation Present and future care of 
the family 
Non-rational love for the 
firm 
Social feeling oriented 
towards voluntary care 
Sufficient income 
Good  professional 
performance 
Applause of the 
colleague and the 
public 
Personal reputation 
Power 
Will to win 
Performance 
Urge to action 
Seeking and 
carrying out of new 
activities 
Intrinsic motivation 
(gratification from 
what he has done) 
Aptitude Bourgeois properness 
Business acumen 
Family spirit 
Autocracy 
Conservatism 
Recognition of 
others 
Attainment of 
moral values 
  
Solving problems Starting new 
businesses 
Function Unite many heterogeneous 
functions 
(planning, the arrangement 
of factors of production, the 
fixation of prices, the 
implementation of 
production…) 
Middleman- 
functions between 
the different 
stakeholders 
Coordinate the 
general direction of 
the business policy 
of his companies 
Decide in 
dangerous 
situations 
Creates novelty 
Focused on the 
entrepreneurial 
function (+ 
functions of 
secondary 
importance: legal 
and financial 
matters. 
Social 
position 
A definite social position 
similar to the one of 
capitalists 
No particular social 
position (division 
of ownership and 
control)  
Ability to 
command and 
dominate 
(leadership)  
No social reference 
point 
Often low social 
and moral status 
 
Figure 4. The different types of entrepreneurs 
  
 
Regarding the aptitude criterion, the different types of entrepreneurs are described by 
Schumpeter as follows: the factory owner and merchant is characterized by bourgeois 
properness, business acumen, family spirit, autocracy and conservatism; the manager is 
motivated by recognition of others (reputation) and attainment of moral values; the promoter 
is competent in starting new businesses and not so much in running them once started; the 
captain of industry is interested in solving problems, more than in business and, against his 
will, he is the pioneer of the planned economy.   
The analysis of the motivation criterion permits to illustrate the problem of conflict between 
self-interest and class-interest from the perspective of Schumpeter’s conception of rationality 
and to stress the idea that conflicting ends produce motivation that results in aptitude. In this 
respect, the factory owner’s attention is turned towards the present and future care of his 
family and towards a ‘non-rational’ love for the firm and his social feeling is oriented towards 
acts of voluntary care. The manager’s motivation is described as an intermediate form of self-
interest: sufficient income and orientation towards the idea of good professional performance, 
applause of the colleagues and the public, as well as personal reputation. The promoter’s 
motivation is oriented towards the seeking and carrying out of new activities, i.e. intrinsic 
motivation and gratification from doing that. Finally, the captain of industry is described as 
someone, who does not only follow his own interests or his family interests, who is not 
simply oriented towards profit as such, but also towards power, performance, the will to win, 
and the urge to action. 
  
From the viewpoint of their functions, the four kinds of entrepreneurs are associated 
with the following characteristics. The factory owner and merchant appears to unite many 
heterogeneous functions (planning, the arrangement of factors of production, the fixation of 
prices, the implementation of production); the manager performs many functions, amongst 
which middleman-functions that sometimes lead to new combinations; the promoter is 
completely focused on the entrepreneurial function even if he also regularly carries out legal 
work and tends to matters of technical finance; the modern captain of industry is the purest 
type of entrepreneur since he does not fulfill accessory functions (as the other types of 
entrepreneurs do) but coordinates the general direction of the business policy of his 
companies, creates novelty, and decides in dangerous situations. It is therefore no surprise that 
the modern captain of industry is the type of entrepreneurship designed for economic change. 
   
If we finally turn to the social position criterion, one can note the crucial role of 
leadership for economic change to occur, i.e., the ability to command and dominate, which all 
the types of entrepreneurs, except the captain of industry, are deprived of. This ability is 
partly individual and partly social, in compliance to our previous discussion on individual 
rationality and social classes. Moreover, it is not limited to the problem of modern 
entrepreneurship. It also characterizes other historical phenomena, such as imperialism (see 
Schumpeter 1951 [1919]). 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
  
Schumpeter’s writings are marked by his constant interest in individual behaviors and 
rationality. Moreover, in his early writings on economic sociology (1951 [1919] and [1927] 
he constantly stressed the fact that individuals have to perform “necessary social functions”. 
His conception of social classes is based on the idea that class structure emerges and evolves 
because individuals, motivated by conflicting ends, perform differently, according to their 
specific aptitudes and the social functions corresponding to the class their families belong to. 
This correspondence is however not a perfect and automatic one: first, because it is subject to 
lags, due both to historical inertia and to the existence of delays in the speed of change of the 
different institutional rules; second, it is relative to the behavior of individuals that are not 
always fulfilling routines, i.e., ‘conventional paths’, but innovate in terms of behavior instead.  
 
This very specific conception of institutional change, which is both individualistic and 
holistic, explains why Schumpeter is so difficult to rank among the economists of the Austrian 
tradition, even though he really contributed to the development of some key tenets of this 
School. What makes also Schumpeter’s conception of economic and social change very 
modern is the fact that institutions are conceived as a multi-level set of rules, each subset 
having its own logic in terms of functions as well as in terms of evolution. From the 
perspective of recent economic literature devoted to the relationships between institutional 
framework and economic development, Schumpeter’s works definitely give us fruitful 
insights33. 
  
                                                 
1 As noted by Swedberg (2006), Schumpeter’s decision to have a seminar on rationality at Harvard in 1939–40 
was triggered in 1939 by a paper on rationality by Chester Barnard. In fact, there were about 10 meetings, 
starting in October 1939 and ending in April 1940. An attempt to put together a book from the papers that were 
presented at the seminar failed, partly because Parsons, who had been appointed co-editor by Schumpeter, lost 
interest. Parsons later confessed that he, in fact, let the project die (Swedberg 2006: 72). Schumpeter’s paper 
presented to the seminar entitled “The meaning of rationality on the social sciences” was many years later 
published by Swedberg (1991), while Parsons’ paper entitled “An approach to the analysis of the role of 
rationality in social action” has remained unpublished. 
2 This conception has to be linked with Schumpeter’s instrumentalism. See Shionoya (1990) and Gonçalves Da 
Silva (2002) for more details on this point. It is however not our aim to deal with this aspect of Schumpeter’s 
methodology inasmuch as it does not interfere with our objective. See also Machlup (1951) who shows that 
Schumpeter both stresses the arbitrariness of the theory and the need for the theory to fit the phenomena. 
3 Related to this matter, Schumpeter parts company with Max Weber concerning his denial of rationality to the 
ancient Chinese on the ground that they relied on examinations in classical literature as a remedy for 
shortcomings displayed in dealing with catastrophic floods (Schumpeter [1940] 1991, 325) 
4 We will see below that this idea is close to what Parsons and Schütz actually developed. Schumpeter red 
Parsons (1937) and appreciated it (see Swedberg 2006). He also has been influenced by Schütz’s works. Schütz 
red Parsons’ book while writing a paper Hayek asked him for Economica from which he was the editor. 
5 He points out that “all that can be legitimately claimed for them [i.e., the ends], on the scientific plane, reduces 
to, first, the task of working out the consequences that action taken in order to realize any given ultimate end 
would have; second, the task of explaining why given people at any given time and place should feel about any 
given ultimate ends as they actually do.” (ibid, 318) 
6 The proposition ‘if then’ is true when the consequent is true and the precedent is false. In other words, it is 
possible to deduce a true property from a false one. 
7 Except for the cases of theories or models based on objective and quantitative relationships, such as those 
derived from data analysis, for instance, or founded on objective and quantitative relationships, such as data 
analysis, for instance (ibid 319-20). These exceptions also refer to two components (the set of theories based on 
logical arguments and the set of theories founded on observations) of the typology of economic theories made by 
Schumpeter in the second chapter of his History of Economic Analysis. 
                                                                                                                                                         
8 It is interesting to note, in passing, that on this issue, Schumpeter disagrees with Weber. As pointed out by 
Walter W. Powell, Schumpeter made several references in his History of Economic Analysis to Weber’s 
‘misleading’ and ‘regrettable’ methodology (Schumpeter 1954, 777). In particular, Schumpeter took issue with a 
core idea of Weber’s that “while we can explain the phenomena of nature, we must understand the phenomena 
of the mind (or of culture)” (Powell 1996, 922). At first sight, this does not seem to be in contradiction with 
Schumpeter. But deeper investigation shows that those parallels between Schumpeter and Weber are only 
surface parallels which mask profound divergence between the two authors on the issue of methodology. In 
particular, Schumpeter dismissed Weber’s use of ideal types, unable to comprehend their utility as yardsticks 
(Powell 1996, 922). For a comparison between Schumpeter and Weber, see MacDonald (1965) and Hansen 
(1966).  
On the issue of rationality in social sciences, what is important to remember, according to Schumpeter, is that  it 
usually requires to set a norm of behavior. The fact that this norm is the result of a process of understanding does 
not imply however that, once it is set by the analyst, economic analysis differs substantially from other sciences.  
9 It is perfectly in line with the following from Schütz: “The first fundamental consequence of this shift in the 
point of view is that the scientist replaces the human beings he observe as actors on the social stage by puppets 
created by himself and manipulated by himself.” (1943, 143). 
10 It is interesting to note that this passage is perfectly in line with what Alchian (1950) and Friedman (1953) 
assume when they consider that producers need not consciously maximize profit and that they are able or not to 
calculate marginal revenue and marginal cost. It suffices to say that they need to do so if they want to survive. 
11 “Social phenomena, on the contrary, we want to understand and we cannot understand them otherwise than 
within the scheme of human motives, human means and ends, human planning -in short- within the categories of 
human action.” (Schütz 1943, 146). 
12 This idea is expressed by Schütz as the postulate of the subjective interpretation and formulated as follows: 
“The scientist has to ask what type of individual mind can be constructed and what typical thoughts must be 
attributed to it to explain the fact in question as the result of its activity within an understandable relation.” 
(Schütz, 1943, 147). He stresses that this postulate complements Weber’s postulate of adequacy.  
13 Page 330 Schumpeter explicitly writes that businessmen may be altruistic (even if based on ‘egoistical’ wish). 
This point sounds very modern if related to recent results in experimental economics. 
14 See note 2 in this article. 
                                                                                                                                                         
15 Schumpeter acknowledges in a footnote that the terms “subjective rationality” and “conscious rationality” 
were infelicitous and contributed to part of the opposition his theory met in the Harvard group. He indicates that 
he should have clarified that by the term ‘conscious’ he also included subconscious behavior such as those 
implied by automatization of often repeated actions, as for instance, the solving of differential equations, in a 
mechanical manner, by an experimented mathematician. (Schumpeter [1940] 1991 fn. 4, 327) 
16 This distinction (between objective and subjective rationality) makes Schumpeter’s conception of rationality in 
the social sciences different from both Parsons and Schütz. Schumpeter is however closer to Parsons that he is to 
Schütz inasmuch as Parsons “fails sufficiently to differentiate the attitude of science from that of the practical 
actor in the life-world. For Schütz there is a considerable more pronounced discontinuity than there is for 
Parsons between the ‘rationality’ of science (natural or social) and the ‘rationality’ of the day to day conduct, 
which is geared to different relevances or interests than those which concern the scientist.” (Gidddens, 1979,  
684). Indeed according to Schütz, “in a theoretical system, therefore, only pure rational types are admitted.” 
(Schütz, 1943, 148). 
17 This Figure is a slightly modified reproduction of Swedberg (2001), who inserts this figure used by 
Schumpeter in a talk he gave on “rationality in economics” on October 27 and November 13, 1939. 
18 The argument should be qualified in the light of the Schumpeter’ footnote concerning subjective rationality 
and conscious rationality (op. cit., see footnote 9 in this article) 
19 It is not to say that classes do have aims and behave as such but that individuals can follow some aims and 
interests that do not conform their own. We will be more precise about this below. 
20 See Festré and Nasica 2006, forthcoming. 
21 “[w]e see, therefore, that families do surmount class barriers, as individuals rather than as a class – though 
quite often in groups – and that they do this in a manner which we can, even today, study in a sufficient number 
of individual cases, as well as in all important groups of cases.” (Schumpeter (1991 [1927], 251) 
22 “[o]nly the physical individual, not the family, is class-born.” (Schumpeter (1991 [1927], 252) 
23 “[t]his has always been the case, but never so much as in the world of capitalism.” (Schumpeter (1991 [1927], 
253) 
24 In Schumpeter (1991 [1927]), we find some development concerning the inheritance of mental characteristics: 
“[a]s for mental characteristics, we have as yet only data in the field of defects, though these are in a state of 
fruitful evolution. For obvious reasons, it is difficult and dangerous to go beyond them, in the field of statistics as 
well as genealogy. Again, therefore, we emphasize that while it may be hopeless to pass considered judgement 
                                                                                                                                                         
significance of a class – and incidentally, on most other basic questions of the social order, past or future – until 
this point has been settled, the basic idea of the class theory here presented is quite independent of it.” 
(Schumpeter 1991 [1927], 216). This statement by Schumpeter can be explained by his reluctance to introduce 
some psychological arguments in his class theory as well as in his theory of economic evolution. 
25 This aspect sounds close to the Marxian assumption that social ‘superstructure’ is determined by economic 
‘infrastructure’. 
26 We refer here to the opposition between punctuated equilibrium vs. gradualism (see N. Eldredge and S.J. 
Gould 1972). 
27 See, for instance, Young (1996). 
28 See R. Arena and A. Festré (2002, 650). 
29 The three chacrateristics of holism are: “1) Society is the ‘whole’ which is more than its parts (holism), 2) 
‘Society’ affects the individual’s aims (collectivism), 3) The social set-up influences and constrains the 
individual’s behavior (institutional analysis)”. Individualism is characterized by:  “1) Only individuals have aims 
and interests (individualism), 2) The individuals behave in a way adequate to their aim, given the circumstances 
(rationality principles), 3) The social set-up is changeable as a result of individuals’ action (institutional 
reform).” (Agassi, 1975, 146). Agassi remarkably shows that these characteristics alone are not contradictory. In 
a similar way  he shows that in order for Institutionalism and Psychologism to contradict one needs to add the 
following proposition: “Either society is primary, or individual is primary, but not both” (ibid, 149). He shows 
that this last proposition is inacceptable. 
30 They act in the sense that they define a set of constraints (see the previous note)  
31 Zafirovski (2003) shows that Schumpeter is one of the possible inspirers of a ‘Unified Non-Rationalist Model 
of Social Action’. 
32 These criteria have been provided by Becker and Knudsen (2004) by way of inference from Schumpeter’s 
1928 article. 
33 Commenting Pareto’s works in economics and sociology, Schumpeter wrote that “[t]he fundamental principle 
that what individuals, groups, and nations actually do must find its explanation in something much deeper than 
the creeds and slogans that are used in order to verbalize action, conveys a lesson of which modern men – and 
none more than we economists – stand much in need.” (Schumpeter, 1949, 172). 
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